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PREFACE 
The wholesale changes to economic life in the past six years have affected the dairy industry 
as much as any other sector within New Zealand. Changes to: 
(a) Taxation ego Taxation of co-operative profits, 
(b) Commercial activity as seen in no longer having tied supplies 
(until the July 1990 regulations!) 
(c) Trying to define ownership of assets without incurring additional taxation has forced 
the dairy industry to question many of its basic tenets it was previously so comfort 
able with. 
The evolution of the New Zealand Dairy Industry to its present form has relied on the 
dynamics of supply and demand expressed in statutory power thus to look beyond with 
specific questions one must examine these in relation to the historical facts or forces before 
any scenarios can be promoted. This is to confirm or deny the original base premise is 
correct, or to give the precedent for a present relationship. 
Hence, in examining present and future ownership, control and representation of the 
structure known as the New Zealand Dairy Board: Let us examine the historical evolution 
of the present structure known as the New Zealand Dairy Board. 
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CHAPTERl 
THE BASE (HISTORICAL) 
The early development of dairying in the 1800's saw the parallel development of both co-
operative and proprietary interests. At first there was a great deal of assistance between 
the two styles of factories, but as the competition for milk supplies increased, so did the 
conflict between the two emerge. 
The major pOint of contention was the milk supply, reqUired to keep a factory fully 
operational. 
It was the eventual co-ordination of the co-operative units that won the day - the relent-
less suspicion of outside interests by the supplier fashioned by the personal sacrifice and 
farming hardship of the pioneering settler. These inbuilt loyalties, which became the 
norm of self-centred rural communities, led to an unjustified mistrust of other organisa-
tions including even other co-operative groups. 
This loose amalgam of groups consolidated,to form an industry voice especially the co-
operatives, so that by 1900, the primary role in Industry Affairs was held by the National 
Dairy Association (NDA) in the North Island and two associations in the South Island. 
The consolidation continued with the two South Island associations becoming the South 
Island Dairy Association (SID A). These two organisations became the national represen-
tative body of the dairy industry under the aegis of NDA until their administrative role 
and functions were taken overby the NZ Dairy Control Board in 1924. 
The assembly of co-operatives channelled through to the NDA enabled better organisa-
tional growth. Mr C.W. Burnard summarised the early development of the NDA: 
"Up till the time this association was formed, there was no one body which could be consulted by 
the Government on questions of grading, inspection of dairies and the like, but once the Associa-
tion was operating it was the body which expressed the views of the Industry as a whole. There 
was hardly a property connected with the Industry which it did not handle in one way of another, 
whether it was the institution of the Dairy schools which played a notable part in the training of 
the managers of the time, or the decisions as to the shape and style of butter box to be used for New 
Zealand dairy produce. " 
It is interesting to note that the Directors of the NDA had to provide personal promissory 
notes as bank security on overdraft; these reaching up to the sum of 400 pounds each! 
The start of the 1914-15 season saw the North Auckland dairy companies institute a vol-
untary agreement where by a supplier rejected at one factory by defects in cream grading 
could not change supply to another factory. These voluntary agreements were not 
enacted into legislation until another thirty years had passed and were, in consequence, a 
major bone of contention between co-operatives that is still visable today. 
The Dairy - Produce Export Control Act 1923 provided for a NZ Dairy Control Board 
consisting of twelve members - nine to be representatives of dairy producers (six North 
Island, three South Island), two Government representives and one to represent the 
proprietary dairy factories and export sellers of dairy produce. The election of Dairy 
Control Board Members was by a tonnage vote by the directors of dairy companies 
within each ward. ("Wards" were defined Geographical areas.) The power of the Board 
included the control of the export, sale and distribution of NZ dairy produce, such 
control to be either absolute or limited as it saw fit. The Act provided the mechanisms 
for the establishment of a London agency to work under the directions of the Board. 
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The Act's extension into marketing was a logical progression following the success of the 
Co-operatives in production. Following reports to the Board, absolute control of dairy 
produce for export was assumed, beginning in 1926. Savings in freight and insurance rates 
were quickly the apparent advantages of national administrative control.* 
The Board's London agency set minimum prices for cheese and butter in 1926 (Australian 
Wool Board 1989-90) but by 1927 large stocks within its hands forced the abandonment of 
the policy. Thus, the Board relinquished control of the export trade back to the private 
importors of Tooley Street, London, Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) of London, NZ 
Producers Co-operative Marketing and NZCDC's marketing arm. - In other terms this 
resulted in free trade. 
Following the Ottawa Imperial Conference of 1933, where Britain unsuccessfully sought to 
impose quotas on imports a royal commission was set up in NZ to report on this state of the 
Dairy Industry. The Dairy Industry Commission 1934 conclusions and recommendation 
included: 
1) Rural Mortgage Corporation. 
2) Improved quality in factory and farm. The Dairy - Produce Control Board be 
empowered to control local marketing of butter and cheese. 
3) Setting up of a "NEW" Dairy - produce Control Board with a different constitution 
and wider powers than that of the present board. 
On the guaranteed price issue, the Commission concluded: 
"Proposals of this kind, however attractive they may appear on the surface, are inherently unsound 
and hedged round with serious administrative difficulties, and any experimentation with them 
cannot be recommended." (Note: Two years later a guaranteed price scheme was in 
operation.) 
Under the Agriculture (emergency powers) Act 1934, a reconstituted dairy board of seven 
members was formed with three Government nominees, 1 member representing NZCDC 
and three to represent all other dairy companies. The new Board was appOinted on the 4th 
April 1935 and took office that day: its title being the New Zealand Dairy Board. The act 
gave the Board the authority to "regulate and control production of dairy produce in New 
Zealand and the handling, marketing,transport and distribution of dairy produce intended 
for consumption in New Zealand." But in relation to export dairy produce, the Boards 
powers were still limited to functions excluding the actual control of marketing eg licensing, 
transport, insurance, advertising etc 
The continued erratic prices on the London market for butter caused by weak selling by 
agents and merchant houses caused consternation within the New Zealand Dairy Board. 
It's London manager, Mr Davis, in reporting to the 1935 Dominion Dairy Conference, 
identified the following marketing matters:-
"Many meetings of importers have been convened by the London 
office in recent years, frequently convened at the request of various importers, in an endeavour to 
obtain some stability ........... The absence of any authority whatsoever on the part of the Industry's 
representatives in London nUllifies the effect of any concerted efforts which they have may agreed to 
make ............. In a period of heavy supplies and increasing stocks, an importer cannot afford, under 
present conditions, to hold even quite moderate stocks ........... Importers cannot be blamed for these 
conditions. They are INHERENT in the system of unregulated marketing and keen competition for 
factory outputs. " 
NOTE: these savings have been estimated to yield over 500,000 pounds with a total administrative 
cost of less than 50,000 pounds! 
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A scheme was developed where by product would be "group" marketed but "control" 
would be retained by the Board until the group organisations could exerdse the market-
ing powers and duties conferred on them. The proposals were approved by the general 
industry but the change to a Labour Government in 1936 stymied the reforms. Instead as 
a result of their election policy, the Government enacted the Primary Products Marketing 
Act 1936. The Act's aim was that: "It was considered essential in the public interest that 
producers of primary products should, as far as possible, be protected from the effects of 
fluctuations in market prices". This was an invitation to the NZ dairy farmer to concen-
trate on his standard of living within NZ and to disregard the export market place. With 
the transfer of authority for marketing removed from the Dairy Board, the government 
reduced the Board's size to 5 members:- the reduction being in the number of govern-
ment nominees. 
The next 11 years were a turbulent time for the industry as both the government and the 
industry came to grips with state marketing and guaranteed prices. The major problem 
was the attempt to isolate the internal costs of production within New Zealand from the 
export market. By 1942-43 most of the problems were resolved by the Dairy Industry 
Cost Adjustment Committee. Another major problem in this era was that the Govern-
ment tended to agree to a price for butterfat based on cost, not one related to what was 
being paid to other suppliers ie the market. 
By 1947 the costs of the internal economy were affecting stabilisation of the costs of the 
dairy industry to such a point that the agitation led to the formation the Dairy Products 
Marketing Commission Act 1942. This Commission took over all the functions of the 
export and internal divisions of the state marketing department subject to complying 
with general trade policy of the government. It was also empowered to fix the gauran-
teed price. The Authority had 3 government representatives and and 3 from industry 
whilst the chairman was government appointed. 
In 1941 due to increasing responsibilities, the Government agreed to the enlargement of 
the Dairy Board to eight including the one government member. The seven producer 
members were elected by the Dairy Companies of: 
North Auckland (one member) 
South Auckland (one member) 
Taranaki (one member) 
Wellington - Hawkes Bay - Marlborough - Nelson (one member) 
South Island (one member) 
NZCDC (two members) 
1952 saw the agreement between the Board and Commission on marketing policy for 
products other than cheese and butter. By 1953 it was recognised by the Commission 
that a unified marketing policy for these products was reqUired. Also in 1953, it was 
recognised that the decontrol of marketing of milk products in the United Kingdom was 
drawing closer - the Commission purchased from NZCDC 
a) A butter packing factory plus the rights to use the "Anchor Brand" 
b) Empire Dairys Ltd for the cheese and butter distribution trade 
It also set up a company known as Milk Products (NZ) Ltd to deal in milk powders. 
By 1956 it was realised that there must be a separation of price fixing from marketing. 
Thus, the Dairy Products Marketing Commission Act was amended in 1957 to provide 
four industry and three Government representatives with the Chairman to be elected 
from within the Commission whilst to provide for a price fixing mechanism, the Dairy 
Products Prices Authority 1957 was enacted. 
4 
In 1961, in response from pressure within the industry, the amalgamation of the Dairy 
Board and Marketing Commission was completed. The united body was formed from 
representatives of: 
North Auckland (two members) 
NZCDC (three members) 
Waikato (one member) 
Bay of Plenty - East Coast (one member) 
Taranaki (two members) 
Wellington - Hawkes Bay - Marlborough - Nelson (one member) 
South Island (one member) 
Government nominees (two members) 
Under the empowering legislation with the title of Dairy Production and Marketing Board 
Act 1961 the joint title was also conferred on the Board. 
Finally the title New Zealand Dairy Board was re-enacted, with no change in membership in 
1965. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPANY MACHINATIONS 
Just as the past six years have been traumatic for the farming community of New Zealand 
so are some of the issues presently being confronted within the Dairy Industry. 
The first issue to be explored is the possiblity of a single company, by a series of amalgama-
tions, gaining control of the New Zealand Dairy Board and the ramifications of such con-
trol. At present, under the Dairy Board Act, the Board shall comprise -
a) Two directors appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the 
Minister. 
b) Seven directors of whom one shall be elected for each of the wards described in the 
first schedule to this Act, and 2 shall be elected for each of the wards described in the second schedule 
to this Act 
First schedule defines i) Northern Ward 
ii) South Auckland 
iii) Eastern 
ivY Wellington 
v) Southern 
Second schedule defines 
i) Taranaki Ward 
c) A director elected in a manner determined by the Board for the purpose of this 
paragraph 
d) Three directors appointed by the New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company Limited 
Thus it is quickly seen that, with the amalgamations within ward areas, wards are becoming 
redundant. For example, the North Island Eastern Ward comprises solely of Bay Milk, the 
Northern Ward is solely the Northland Dairy Co-operative whilst the South Auckland 
Ward, Taranaki and Wellington Wards comprises more than one manufacturer there is only 
one dominant and controlling player in each e.g. Kiwi in Taranaki, Waikato Valley's in 
South Auckland and Tui in the Wellington Ward. In fact, it is only the South Island Ward 
where an election is truly necessary on the basis of supply of milkfat as laid down in the 
Act. 
SUPPLYING COMPANIES IN THE SOUTH ISLAND WARD 
Kaikora 
Westland 
Plains 
Alpine 
Otago 
Southland 
(kgMF) 
860,000 
6,498,000 
525,000 
8,457,000 
2,102,000 
3,966,000 
Although the five North Island wards are not completely one Regional Company, as 
mooted way back in 1957 by Mr Hayward, acting chairman of NZDB, yet they are regional-
ised for representation to the Dairy Board. NB. New Zealand Dairies (NZCDC) in reality 
have their own ward based on the wording of the Dairy Board Act. 
With the control of the North Island Wards by a single manufacturer any further Company 
amalgamations could lead to control of the New Zealand Dairy Board. 
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This scenario caused a fair degree of agitation within supplier ranks and led to some pa-
rochial stands. However, the ramifications are not necessarily as dangerous as on first 
glance. The marketing of dairy prod uce on the world market is becoming more and 
more inelastic as regards demand. As demand becomes more inelastic - price becomes 
the determinant of supply. Therefore, any small manufacturer from New Zealand could 
threaten the entire structure of the New Zealand Dairy Board by undermining the pricing 
structure of the Board on the open market. 
This threat is adequate and sufficient to hold in check any monopoly that may develop 
and control the Dairy Board. Also the co-operative background of the Dairy Industry 
will temper any monopoly. Another threat of the same ilk often espoused is that of 
corporate entities attempting to gain a foothold into the marketing of New Zealand dairy 
produce. Again, the percieved threat would be to undermine the pricing structures of 
the whole industry i.e. operate as a 'weak' seller. 
The major factor in negation of this possibility lies firstly in the Dairy Board Act Section 
17: 
Powers of Board as to aquisition and marketing of export produce - (1) Without 
limiting any of the powers conferred on the Board by this Act or otherwise howsoever, 
the Board shall have full authority to make and carry out such arrangements as it thinks 
proper for any of the following purposes: 
a) for the aquisition and marketing by the Board of Export Produce: (where 
export produce means any goods or produce manufactured in New Zealand 
that contains more than 30% by weight of dairy produce) 
b) for the handling, pooling, transport and storage of export produce: 
c) for the consignment of export produce on such terms and in such quantities 
as it thinks fit 
h) for prohibiting, restricting and controlling the export of any export produce 
other than by the Board: 
AND 
1A) Without limiting any of the powers conferred on the Board by 
this Act or otherwise howsoever, the Board shall have full 
authority to make and carry out such arrangements as it thinks 
proper for prohibiting, restricting and controlling the export 
otherwise than by the Board to any country specified in that 
behalf by the Governor General by Order in Council of any 
compound or mixture (packed otherwise than for retail sale 
without further processing or packaging, and otherwise than in 
units of 2 kg or less) that -
a) Contain not less than 60% by weight of dairy produce: 
b) In the opinion of the Board is used or capable of being used substantially in 
substitution for that dairy produce contained in it, or for any component of 
the dairy produce. 
And secondly in section 43 of the Commerce Act which states the Commerce Act does 
not take precedence over any other Act that has definitive clauses concerning marketing. 
This is certainly the case with Section 17 of the Dairy Board Act. Thus the status quo will 
remain as long as the intent of both sections of their respective Acts are not repealed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DAIRY BOARD STRUCTURE 
The evolution of the Board to its present form has been detailed in the historical section of 
this report but what must beconsidered is whether the structure is appropriate to today's 
requirement of accountability and representation and into tomorrow's environment. 
PRESENT FUNCTIONS 
The present functions of the New Zealand Dairy Board consists of a mixture of commercial, 
regulatory and servicing activities that are initally described in the empowering legislation. 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
The structure of the Dairy Board's commercial activities emanates directly from the four 
product division (proteins, milkpowders, cream and cheese) from and through these divi-
sions, marketing and distribution is organised to get the produce into the market. 
REGULATORY ACTIVITIES 
The Board is empowered with vesting orders for control over storage, grading, processing 
and transport. These powers extend into export licensing. 
SERVICING ACTIVITIES 
Within this sphere, the Board accepts responsibility to the supplier in providing "commer-
cial" services. This in the greater part is organised under the umbrella of the Livestock 
Improvement Council and contains herd testing, provision of artificial breeeding require-
ments and consulting office service. 
A recent development in the servicing field is the joint venture between the NZDB and 
MAF for the continuation of research based primaraly at Ruakura and Taranaki Agriculture 
Research Stations. 
LEVIES 
The Board is empowered to levy the manufacturing companies on dairy produce manufac-
tured under section 41 of the Act. At present levies are collected and applied in the follow-
ing cases: 
a) Production Levy 
b) Superannuation Levy 
c) Research and development Levy 
d) Dairy Industry employers association 
c) Strike claim Levy 
PRESENT STRUCTURE 
The present representation on the New Zealand Dairy Board is determined by the Dairy 
Board Act 1961 section 3. As has been previously stated, (see chapter 2) the five North 
Island wards have evolved to where there is one single company dominant (greater than 
50% of milk fat supplied) within each ward. Thus each of the companies can appoint 
directors to the Dairy Board rather than having a necessity for elections which was the 
original intention of creating wards. At present the Southern ward is the only ward still 
exhibiting the original objectives of the creation of Wards. 
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NAME OF WARD 
Northern 
South Auckland 
Eastern 
Wellington 
Taranaki 
DOMINANT CaMP ANY 
Northland Dairy Co-op 
Waikato Valley's 
Bay Milk 
Tui 
Kiwi 
Under the present scheme, a supplying shareholder in a manufacturing company has the 
right to vote for the directors to represent him/her within the company structure. In 
reality, most shareholders can only influence the election of part of their Board as most 
companies conduct their elections within the framework of the ward system. Thus:-
SUPPLYING SHAREHOLDER 
WAW WAW WAW WAW WAW 
~\ // 
DAIRY COMPANY 
WARD WARD WARD WARD WARD WARD WARD 
"\\\ III 
NEW ZEALAND DAIRY BOARD 
The present structure for representation has developed from the initial premise that the 
NZDB was the marketing arm of the companies - therefore the representation reflects 
that aim. 
Under the present structure, the supplier has no direct representation; only, an indirect 
control of the board via the company directorship. The suppliers' mandate to his/her 
company is limited in most cases on two levels. 
Firstly, the supplier usually can only vote within a ward for the company director's -
usually a maximum of three directors of a total board of twelve to sixteen members. (see 
appendix I - directors responsibilities) 
Secondly the franchise a supplier can exercise is further limited by some companies, by 
controlling the maximum number of votes an individual entity can cast in an election. 
(N.B. generally a supplier has a voting entitlement that is based on milkfat supplied to 
the company in the proceeding season. The entitlement is expressed as: 
one vote/ x kg of milkfat) 
Thirdly, if that individual's supply is within the boundaries of the five North Island 
wards, but does not supply Northland, Bay Milk, Waikato Valley'S, New Zealand Dairies, 
Kiwi or Tui, they are effectively disinfranchised from representation on the New Zealand 
Dairy Board. 
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None of these "problems" were a worry for the supplier whilst the Industry was working 
within the guidelines of the Primary Products Marketing Act 1936. The Act provided:-
"In fixing prices under the section in respect of Dairy Produce exporting before that date, and to the 
following additional considerations, namely: 
The necessity in the public interest of maintaining the stability and efficiency of the Dairy Industry. 
The costs envolved in the efficient production of dairy produce. 
The general standard of living of persons engaged in the Dairy Industry in comparison with the 
general standard of living throughout New Zealand. 
The estimated cost of the department of marketing the dairy produce concerned, and also the cost of 
the general administration of this Act. Any other matters defined to be relevent. 
Due regard having been paid to the several matters mentioned, the prices fixed in respect of any dairy 
produce exported after the 31st July 1937 share be such that any efficient produce engaged in the 
dairy industry under usual conditions and in normal circumstances should be assured of a sufficient 
net return from his business to enable him to maintain himself and his family in a REASONABLE 
STATE OF COMFORT! 
In other words, a dairy supplier was a social welfare beneficiary!! As such, the Government 
distributed the returns to the supplier with the added security of a guaranteed prices policy. 
The Guaranteed Prices and Stabilisation Scheme, funded by the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, continued through to when the New Zealand Dairy Board resumed responsibility 
in 1986. 
Thus the dairy suppliers of New Zealand were wards of the New Zealand Government: 
cossetted and protected from the vagaries of world trade; their direct mandate was as-
sumed by the Government of New Zealand who exercised their mandate by the statutory 
appointment of directors to the New Zealand Dairy Board. 
Since the abolition of the Guaranteed Prices and Stabilisation Scheme in 1986, the individual 
supplier has no direct representation on the Dairy Board. Yet the board has assumed the 
responsibility of declaring each years payout to which each company adds its own effi-
ciency component and adjusts the final returns to the supplier. 
NZDB $ payout + company $ efficiency = $ return to supplier 
For instance in the 1989/90 year the figures were: 
$5.80 + $0.50 = $6.30 
(average) 
(see appendix III) 
Thus the NZ Dairy Board directly announced in the vicinity of 80 - 90% of the annual 
income derived from milkfat of the individual supplier with the manufacturing companies 
responsible for the balance. 
But the argument often espoused is that without the manufacturing companies there would 
be no one available to convert the raw material into a saleable product. This is patently 
obvious as is the necessity of a marketing arm that can place the saleable product and reflect 
the markets's requirements back to the manufacturer. However, neither of these two, the 
manufacturer and marketer, are necessary or viable without the supplier of the raw mate-
rial. In fact the two former are a direct result of the supply of milk being initiated. 
Therefore, the supplier of milk is the major ingredient in the equation of the stuctures of the 
dairy industry. Yet, the present structure does not directly represent the supplier and will 
not therefore reflect their asset investment within the industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES 
The proceeding chapter has shown serious flaws over the direct control the suppliers of 
dairy produce can exert. Thus new options must be considered to see if they add to the 
suppliers security, whilst still containing representation for the manufacturers. 
DIRECT SUPPLIERS REPRESENTATION 
The ward system would be retained within the industry to allow elections from both the 
manufacturers and the suppliers to the board. 
NZDB~ 
MANUFACTURER 
/' 
SUPPLIER 
For the purpose of an example within this scenario allow one representative/manufac-
turer/ward with two representatives to NZ Dairies Ltd, giving a total of 8 directors 
elected from this source. From the seven wards (consider the suppliers of NZ Dairies as 
one ward) seven director"s representing the suppliers would form the remainder of the 
Board, thus as equitable solution for representing both parties to the New Zealand Dairy 
Board is found. 
MECHANISM'S FOR THE SUPPLIER MANDATE 
If the supplier's direct vote is retained to only one ward, a similar charge of under repre-
sentation can be levied against this scheme. To counter this possibility, it is proposed 
that the election of representatives from wards can be elected by a preferential voting 
system as detailed in appendix II (Note: This system has already been used in the Dairy 
Industry to elect representatives to the Dairy Products Marketing Commission in 1948.) 
Thus the suppliers from a ward would know that their elected representatives won the 
majority of votes cast within the ward. 
OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS 
The definition of ownership of assets of the NZDB are presently ill-defined. With a 
change in structure of representation as commented above; it would make equitable 
sense to hold the assets in trust for the present and future suppliers. It is recognised that 
the industry assets have grown from the past endeavours of dairy farmers, to be utilised 
by the present dairy farmers. This takes cognizance of the reality that the assets of the 
industry are available for use by the present suppliers without being a charge against 
them. Conversely, when leaving the Industry, a supplier has no rights to realise the 
portion of the industry assets nominally apportioned to him/her. 
Therefore, the proposal is to hold the industry assets in suppliers names rather that the 
manufacturers. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
At present the Dairy Board Act says "Obligation to lenders must take procedence 
over payments to farmers for supply ie. payment for supply of products is a resid-
ual obligation." Thus the proposal is:-
1. Election of representatives to the New Zealand Dairy Board be split 
between 
a) The Suppliers 
b) The Manufacturers 
2. Assets owned by the Industry be nominally held by the suppliers. 
Therefore the criteria for direct recognition within the industry is attained by both 
groups. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE FIDUCIARY POSITION OF THE DIRECTOR 
Directors are Trustees of the property of the company under their control and must 
account to the company for all such property. In the exercise of their powers, they 
must act in the best interest of the company. 
- Hallsbury Law's of England. 
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APPENDIX II 
THE PREFERENTIAL VOTING SYSTEM IN 
SINGLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 
"Object of the Preferential Vote: The object of the preferential vote in single-member con-
stituencies is to ensure, without having recourse to a second ballot, that the candidate 
elected shall have an absolute majority of the votes polled. 
"How to give effect to the Preferential Method of Voting: In marking his ballot-paper, the 
elector is required to place the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate for whom he 
votes as his first preference, and he may give contingent votes for the remaining candidates 
by placing the figures 2, 3,4 (and so on, as the case requires) opposite their names respec-
tively, so as to indicate the order of his preference for such candidates in the event of the 
candidate of his first choice not being elected. 
(The marking of contingent votes is, of course, only necessary when there are more than two 
candidates standing). 
Example of Ballot-Paper Preferentially Marked. 
3 BROWN 
1 JONES 
2 SMITH 
4 WATSON 
"Method of counting the Votes under Preferential Voting System. If, on counting the votes 
after the poll, it is found that no candidate has received an absolute majority of first-prefer-
ence votes, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is declared defeated, 
and his ballot-papers distributed among the remaining candidates according to the second 
preferences marked thereon. 
"If no candidate then has an absolute majority of votes, the procedure of declaring the 
candidate who has the lowest votes to be defeated and distributing his ballot-papers among 
the non-defeated candidates next in order of the voters' preference is repeated, and the 
votes recounted after every such redistribution until some candidate is found to have an 
absolute majority of votes. 
"It will thus be seen that by means of the preferential vote the elector retains his influence 
upon the result until the candidate is finally elected. 
"Effect of marking second and further preferences: The marking of a ballot-paper with 
second, third, or further preferences does not in any way injure the prospects of the candi-
date for whom the first preference vote is given. An elector's second preference becomes 
operative only after the candidate in whose favour he recorded his first preference is de-
clared defeated; and in like manner, a third preference becomes operative only when the 
candidates who received the first and second preference votes have been declared defeated. 
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ILLUSTRATION OF PREFERENTIAL COUNT: 
The procedure at an official count of the votes may be illustrated as follows: 
Jones Smith Brown Watson total 
First Count - First preference votes 1826 1358 1149 1090 5423 
No candidate having received an "absolute 
majority" of first preference votes, the lowest 
candidate, Watson, is declared defeated, and 
his ballot-papers distributed among the remaining 
candidates according to the second preferences 
marked thereon, thus 249 526 315 1090 
Result of Second Count 2075 1884 1464 5423 
Result of Second Count Jones Smith Brown Watson total 
As no candidate has yet an "absolute majority" 
the lowest candidate, Brown, is declared defeated, 
and his ballot-papers (including those transferred 
to him from Weston, the former defeated candidate) 
distributed between Jones and Smith according to 
the preferences marked thereon in favour of 
these candidates, thus 
Result of Third and Final Count 507 957 1464 
Totals 2582 2841 5423 
Smith having attained an "absolute majority", is declared elected. 
Mr C P Agar asked whether it was not the intention of the committee that the NZ Co-op Dairy Company 
should continue to have one representative on the Dairy Commission. 
Mr A Hayward (NZ Co-op Dairy Co.) said that his company did not have a special delegate on the Commis-
sion, and at the previous year's Conference Mr Agar himself had said that is would be better if they did not 
have any particular dairy company represented, or any parochial feeling, but that he could not conceive that 
there would not be a NZ Dairy Company man on it. There was not at the present nor had there been, any 
understanding that the NZ Dairy Company should have a delegate on the Commission. 
Mr C P Agar said his impression had been that because of the size of the NZ Dairy Company's orgaisation 
they should have had a delegate on the Commission, but apparently the matter was not handled that way. 
(Continuation of the discussion on this subject will be found below). 
Remit No.1 withdrawn by request. 
As the luncheon adjournment had been nearly reached it was decided to defer discussion of the report until 
the afternoon. Conference then dealt with Remit No. I, from the Morrinsville Ward Conference, this reading 
as follows: 
"That all members of the Dairy Industry Council, whether elected delegates to the Conference or not, 
should be accorded the right to vote upon all matters, as well as to speak in regard to proposals which 
may be before the Conference." 
Mr Hale said he thought there had been a little misunderstanding on the matter. Mr Alexander had dis-
cussed the matter with him that morning, and he (Mr Hale) understood that it was desired to withdraw the 
remit. 
Mr A G Alexander (Northern Ward) said that the position had been misunderstood at the time the remit 
went before the Morrinsville Conference. They were satisfied that the decision made by the Dominion 
Conference the previous year was a sound one, and the delegates from the Northern Ward all agreed that the 
present position was satisfactory. He therefore asked leave to withdraw the remit. 
The remit was withdrawn and Conference adjourned till 2.00 pm. 
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PAYOUT AT FARMGATE (Provisional) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------
1989/90 Season 1988/89 Season 1987/88 Season 
-- .. ---- .... ----- -------------- --------------
Adv. Price: 580.00' c/kg Adv. Price: 530.00 c/kg Adv. Price: 360.00 c/kg 
-------------------- --------------------------------- --------------------------------- ---------------------------------
Farmgate Variation % Farmgate Variation % Farmgate Variation % 
Dairy Company Payout Adv.Price Variation Payout Adv.Price Variation Payout Adv.Price Variation Corrmcnts: 
--------------------
---------- .. ----------------------
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
- ..... ------
Alpine Dairy Prod 580.00 .00 0% 510.00 (20.00) -3.8% 385.00 25.00 6.9% 
Bay Milk Prod 640.00 60.00 10.3% 500.00 (30 . 00) -5.7"!. 406.11 46.11 12.8% 
East Tamaki 650.00 70.00 12.1% 592.00 62.00 11. 7"1. 427.00 67.00 18.6% 
Kaikoura 610 . 00 30 . 00 5.2% 550.00 20.00 3.8% 360.62 0.62 0.2% > ~ 
Kiwi 645.00 65.00 11.2% 590.00 60.00 11.3% 415.00 55.00 15.3% ~ 
I-' tr1 
01 Marlborough Cheese 605.00 25.00 4.3% 557.00 27.00 5.1% 367.41 7.41 2.1% Z 
Moanui 635.00 55.00 9.5% 578.30 48.30 9.1% 408.63 48.63 13.5% 88/89,87/88-Avge Moanui/Egmont ~ ~ 
M.T.V. 640.00 60.00 10.3% 570.00 40.00 7.5% 415.00 55.00 15.3% ~ 
~ 
N.Z.C.D.C. 640.00 60.00 10.3% 577.00 47.00 8.9% 415.00 55.00 15.3% ~ ~ 
Northland 595.00 15.00 2.6% 567.25 37.25 7.0% 385.11 25.11 7.0% 88/89,87/88-Avge N'land/N ~airoa 
Otago Coop 645.00 65.00 11.2% 625.00 95.00 17.9% 437.00 77.00 21.4% 
Otago Cheese 575.00 (5.00) -0.9% 559.00 29.00 5.5% 367.00 7.00 1.9% 
Southland 620.00 40.00 6.9% 590.00 60.00 11.3% 415.00 55.00 15.3% 
Tasman 580.00 .00 0% 524.00 (6.00) -1.1% 373.00 13.00 3.6% 
Tatua 650.00 70.00 12.1% 590.00 60.00 11.3% 428.00 68.00 18.9% 
Tui 615.00 35.00 6.0% 578.85 48.85 9.2% 404.46 44.46 12.3% 88/89,87/88-Avge Tui/Manawatu 
~estland 620.20 40.20 6.9% 555.00 25.00 4.7% 380.00 20.00 5.6% 
~aikato 640.00 60.00 10.3% 585.00 55.00 10.4% 400.00 40.00 11.1% (88/89 Includes 15.00 c/kg paid 87/88) 
Awatuna 585.00 55.00 10.4% 412.30 52.30 14.5% 
Average (weighted) 630.05 50.05 8.6% 569.71 39.71 7.5% 406.44 46.44 12.9% 
---------------------.---------------.----------------------------.-.---------------------------------------------------------. (Average based on 100.0% Milkfat ex Own Suppliers) Joan Gargan Ext 8940 
Corporate Management Accounting 
FINANCE DIVISION 26-Sep-90 
REFERENCES 
1. Philpott, H G A history of the New Zealand Dairy Industry. 
2. Ward, A H A Command of Cooperatives. 
3. 
Woods, R The Role of the Producer Boards. 
4. New Zealand Dairy Board Background and Perspective. 
5. Woods, R A Fabric for the Fibre Industry. 
6. Van Wassenaer, A The New Zealand Dairy Board: 
Coordination and Incentives in a Co-operative. 
7. Economic Development Commission, 1987 
Restructuring Rural Industries - the Role of the 
Prod ucer Boards. 
17 
